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Abstract
Matching frictions and downward wage rigidity emerge as equilibrium phenomena in a twosided labor market where firms sustain variable wage adjustment costs. Firms post wages
to attract workers and matches are endogenous. Reducing the wage relative to the wage
previously posted is costly to the firm, where the cost is proportional to the size of the
proposed cut. Shocks to the firm’s profitability may yield an equilibrium wage above what
the firm would offer absent proportional adjustment costs. Wage cuts can be partial or full,
immediate or delayed, and are non-linear in the shock size. Importantly, wages are sticky
even if firms have negligible costs for cutting wages.
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Introduction

A large body of empirical evidence suggests that real wages are not very flexible
downward. Firms rarely push through wage cuts (e.g., Agell and Lundborg, 2003;
Bewley, 1995; Holzer and Montgomery, 1993), in contrast with the equilibrium prediction of the typical directed search model of frictional labor markets. This kind
†
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of wage rigidity has also been observed in laboratory economies where workers can
direct their search to a firm of their choice (Fehr and Falk, 1999). We ask: can this
phenomenon emerge as an equilibrium of frictional labor markets where search can
be directed?
Here, we show that equilibrium downward wage rigidity naturally emerges in
two-sided labor markets where search is costless and labor market frictions emerge
endogenously as in Peters (1984) and Burdett et al. (2001) among many others. To
study wage dynamics in a frictional labor market we embed the directed search model,
which is static, in an infinitely-lived economy (e.g., as in Albrecht et al., 2006). The
model assumes that all matches break at the end of a period, so the existence of
equilibrium price rigidities does not rely on the existence of insurance motives when
market participants are risk averse and can commit to multi-period contracts (e.g.,
as in Rudanko, 2009). Moreover, in symmetric equilibrium the wage is unique so the
mechanism responsible for price rigidities is not based on assuming a specific focal
point when a continuum of bargained wages exists (e.g., as in Hall, 2005).
The model has a two-sided structure as in Peters (1984), where search is costless
and unrestricted. In each period many profit-maximizing firms compete in posted
wages to attract many utility-maximizing workers who independently direct their
search. Lack of coordination among workers is a constant source of frictions, which
gives rise to a trade-off for workers and firms: applying to a higher-wage job lowers
the probability of being hired, while posting a lower wage reduces the probability of
filling a vacancy. This basic market structure forms the basis of the directed search
literature of labor markets (e.g., as in Burdett et al., 2001; Shimer, 2005). Its key
characteristic is that, in symmetric equilibrium, the distributions of workers across
firms and of wages reflect the market structure. In particular, labor market frictions
emerge endogenously because workers choose to direct their search at random based
on the distribution of wages that are posted in the period.
The innovation, relative to the directed search models, is the introduction of a
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variable asymmetric wage adjustment cost. It is assumed that if the firm offers a wage
below what it offered in the past, then this wage cut is costly to implement because it
generates a variable cost to the firm, which is proportional to the size of the proposed
cut. In particular, the cost vanishes as the size of the wage cut shrinks to zero. The
central question is: how do firms react when market conditions suddenly change? We
identify five levels of the wage posted in the previous period by a firm, which allow full
characterization of current wage choices in Markov-perfect equilibrium: an exit wage,
below which the firm can never attract workers; a target wage, which maximizes the
firm’s expected profit in the absence of any adjustment cost; a trigger wage, below
which the firm optimally chooses not to adjust the current wage; a break-even wage,
above which there is no wage rigidity; and an inactive threshold wage above which
the firm prefers to remain temporarily idle; see Figure 1.

target

0

z
exit

v∗

break-even

vτ

v̄

trigger

z̄
inactive threshold

Figure 1: Five key wages
The analysis, reveals that downward wage rigidity generally emerges endogenously, in Nash equilibrium. The resulting wage may lie above temporarily or
permanently the ‘ideal’ target wage. The extent of rigidity nonlinearly depends
on the severity of the shock. Firms always react to favorable shocks i.e., shocks that
raise their target wage by fully raising the wage to the new target in order to best
compete for workers. By contrast, firms will cut wages in reaction to an unfavorable
shock only when their target wage sufficiently drops.
Equilibrium wage cuts can be partial or full, immediate or delayed, depending on
the shock size. There is a full wage cut when, following the shock, the firm posts
3

exactly the target wage. The wage cut is partial, when the firm instead posts a wage
in between the target wage and the previous period’s wage. A permanent negative
shock induces the firm to optimally cut the wage only if the shock is sufficiently
large and even so, full wage cuts are implemented only in extreme cases. This
gives rise to three interesting results. First, the decision to cut wages is negatively
associated with the size of the induced cost. Importantly, wages are sticky even if
cutting the wage entails a negligible adjustment cost for the firm. By contrast, wages
are cut in response to shocks that significantly lower the target wage, even if this
implies high adjustment costs. Second, the size of a wage cut responds non-linearly
to the adjustment cost. Generally, firms will push through only partial wage cuts, and
only shocks that significantly reduce the firm’s profitability will trigger a full wage
cut. Third, the firm may optimally choose to temporarily leave the market, and then
re-enter it by offering a lower wage. Whether or not this will occur depends on the
size of the shock.
Our model assumes that wage adjustment costs arise whenever the firm hires a
worker at a wage below the previous period’s wage. The adjustment cost is proportional to the size of the wage cut, and is asymmetric, there is no benefit if the wage
increases. This modeling choice is economically meaningful: it allows us to capture
the important empirical observation that worker’s productivity depends on worker’s
morale, and downward wage rigidity results from employers’ desire to avoid harming
worker’s morale and performance through a wage cut. These observations emerge
from multiple surveys (e.g., Bewley, 1995; Campbell and Kamlani, 1997; Kaufman,
1984) as well as a recent field experiment (Kube et al., 2013). Simply put, there is
evidence that work effort of existing and newly hired workers alike depends upon
workers’ morale, and workers’ morale is negatively affected by wage cuts, though not
necessarily by a low wage level. As a consequence, firms are reluctant to lower wages.
The mechanism explored in this paper supports wage rigidity through a different
mechanism a variable cost compared to assuming efficiency wages or fixed adjust-
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ment costs which are popular justifications of wage rigidity. In the efficiency wage
literature (e.g., Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984) offering a wage below market disproportionately lowers productivity, so hiring a worker at that lower wage is unprofitable for
the firm at any point in time. By contrast, it is the size of the wage cut that matters
in our model (not the wage level), and hiring a worker at the lower wage is always
profitable for the firm; the wage cut only generates an internal cost.
As in the literature on menu costs, our model assumes an explicit adjustment
cost. However, the properties of the adjustment cost in our model are different
as compared to other models with explicit adjustment costs. In particular, in the
menu costs literature the cost is typically lump-sum and does not vanish as the wage
adjustment vanishes (e.g., see Ball and Romer, 1991). This implies that sufficiently
small wage cuts are unprofitable. By contrast, in our model the adjustment cost
varies proportionately with the size of the cut, and vanishes as the size of the wage
cut goes to zero. As a result small wage cuts can in principle be profitable.
The paper proceeds by presenting the model in Section 2. The analysis is laid out
in Section 3. Section 4 concludes by offering a discussion of the main features of the
model in relation to the literature on the exogenous random matching models and
how wage rigidity would be affected if we introduced the possibility of multi-period
matches.

2

The model

Time is discrete, t = 1, 2, . . . There are infinitely-lived agents of two types, j ∈ J =
{1, . . . , J} firms and i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I} homogeneous workers. We assume large
markets by letting J → ∞ with I = rJ, where 1/r > 0 denotes market tightness, i.e.,
the ratio of vacancies to job-seekers. Therefore we work with countably many workers
and firms. Every agent discounts the future at geometric rate β ∈ (0, 1). Each period
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has two stages: wage posting and hiring.1
In the first stage of each period t each firm independently posts a wage vt which
is earned by the worker who is hired; there is no cost from posting wages. In the
second stage, workers see all posted wages and choose to visit one firm; there is no
cost from visiting a firm (see Virag, 2010, for a model where visiting a firm entails a
fixed cost).
After matches are realized one vacancy is filled at all firms that have met at least
one worker. Matches last only one period, so that separation is certain at the end of
the period. Unmatched parties and those matched parties who do not trade obtain
zero payoff in the period. If firm j hires a worker on date t > 1, then the worker
receives vt and the firm’s profit is φj (vt ; vt−1 ), which depends on the current wage
vt and the previous period’s wage vt−1 . In particular, it is assumed that lowering
the wage from the previously posted wage generates a variable cost to the firm. The
cost is proportional to the size of the wage cut, so that small wage reductions have
a minimal impact on profit of the firm during the period. Moreover, the profit of all
future matches remains unaltered. The profit of the firm is formulated by means of
the piece-wise profit function

φj (vt ; vt−1 ) :=





φ̃j (vt ) − (vt−1 − vt )cj 1vt <vt−1 if t > 1,




φ̃j (vt )

(1)

if t = 1,

where
φ̃j (v) := aj − bj v ≥ φj (v; vt−1 )
aj
is called the
bj
break-even wage. Since v̄j is the crucial element of the analysis, we will normalize
with 0 < cj < bj . We have φ̃j (v) ≥ 0 for all v ∈ [0, v̄j ] where v̄j =

1

The model and notation reflect the formulation adopted in Kim and Camera (2014), to which we
refer the reader for additional details and implied proofs of statements.
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bj = 1 for all firms, i.e., we assume perfectly transferable utility. See Figure 2. Since
in the initial period t = 1 there is no history of previous wages, the profit function is
simply φj (v1 , v0 ) = φ̃j (v1 ).2
φj

φ̃j

φj (0; vt−1 )
φ̃j (vt−1 )

vt

vt−1

vt
v̄j

Figure 2: The profit function φj (vt ; vt−1 )
Notes: The red line is the adjustment cost from cutting the wage to vt from vt−1 .

We now discuss the matching function on a generic date t, omitting the argument t
when understood. Consider symmetric equilibria, which are the focus in the literature
(see Norman, 2015, for a way to justify this focus). Let λj denote the expected number
of workers who visit firm j in a symmetric outcome where workers are indifferent
across all firms and so choose them at random. Given the large size of the market, a
standard result is that workers are distributed according to a Poisson with parameter
λj (Peters, 1984). Consequently we let

M(λj ) := 1 − e−λj
2

To reduce the notational burden, we will not make this distinction explicit in the remainder of
the paper, when no confusion arises. Conceptually, assuming φj (v1 , v0 ) = φ̃j (v1 ) is equivalent to
assuming φj as in definition (1) for all t ≥ 1 and v0 = 0.
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denote the unconditional probability that firm j trades on date t.3
It is assumed that firms who are visited by more than one worker randomly hire
one of the workers who are present. Again, the standard result is that the function

H(λj ) :=

1 − e−λj
M(λj )
=
,
λj
λj

can be used denote the conditional probability that a worker is hired when she visits
a firm who expects λj workers on date t.
In a symmetric outcome workers must be indifferent across all firms j ∈ J . Hence,
letting vj denote the wage offered by firm j on date t, the following indifference
condition must hold:

H(λj )vj = H(λk )vk = U

for all j, k ∈ J .

Above, we have used U to denote the expected utility that workers receive on the
market in a symmetric outcome. This notation will be convenient later because,
given U , we immediately see that the indifference constraint implies that the queue
λj depends only on vj . When understood, we will omit the argument vj from λj (vj ).
Discussion and interpretation. Our model of adjustment costs can be interpreted as one in which a higher past wage acts like a reduction in productivity. To
drive this point home, notice that for the case vt < vt−1 , we can reformulate the profit
function in our model as follows:4

φ(vt ; vt−1 ) := v̄ − cvt−1 − (1 − c)vt ∝ yt − vt
3

One may be tempted to conclude that our analysis can be simplified, at virtually no cost, by
imposing an urn-ball matching process. This conclusion is incorrect. The possibility to direct
search dramatically changes incentives not only in equilibrium, but also off-equilibrium. See the
discussion in Section 4 about the importance of a micro-foundation for the matching function M.
4
We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this interpretation and reformulation.
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v̄ − cvt−1
is the firm’s productivity, which declines in vt−1 .
1−c
A possible mechanism generating this negative association between past wages and

where yt :=

current productivity is tied to the well-received empirical observation that worker’s
productivity depends on worker’s morale. In this case, downward wage rigidity may
results from employers’ fear that a wage cut would harm worker’s morale and productivity. There are several studies providing empirical support to this productivity
channel.
The study in Bewley (1995) reports findings from 334 interviews of business owners, managers and human-resource executives from a variety of U.S. small and large
companies, during the years 1992-1994. The central conclusion is that the main causes
of downward wage rigidity have to do with employers’ belief that worker’s productivity depends on worker’s morale, and wage cuts have a negative effect on morale
of existing employees, and also of new hires. Results from the more recent survey in
Campbell and Kamlani (1997) confirm this conclusion. Respondents indicated that
among the greatest deterrents to wage cuts we find the fear that a wage cut would
lead to less effort because it would lower workers’ morale. The survey also revealed
that workers respond more strongly to a wage cut than to low wages. The study in
Kaufman (1984) strikes a similar note for U.K firms, with the authors noting that
employers felt that wage reductions, especially those unaccompanied by credible information concerning a financial crisis, would lower morale and effort. In a controlled
field experiment that minimized reputation effects and ruled out the possibility of
repeated employment, Kube et al. (2013) finds that wage cuts significantly lower
workers’ productivity, whereas wage increases do not affect it.
It should be clear that the particular combination of assumptions adopted in our
model does not allow it to capture all features of the economies analyzed in the
aforementioned studies the presence of incumbent workers, or possible behavioral
effects on application probabilities, for example. Our model is simply designed to
capture the key operating principle that is common to all the aforementioned studies:
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employers’ wage choices are influenced by the prospect that a wage cut has adverse
effects on workers’ productivity. The adjustment cost in our model can be therefore
interpreted as workers’ productivity decline stemming from a decline in morale. This
cost reflects the size of the wage cut but not necessarily the level of the wage, as
seen above. The asymmetry in adjustment cost captures the evidence that workers
respond asymmetrically to a wage cut as opposed to a wage increase.

3

Equilibrium wages

Here we study the equilibrium behavior of a generic firm, so we omit the indicator j
whenever it is understood. We let v ∗ ∈ (0, v̄) denote the target wage, i.e., the wage
that the firm optimally posts in the absence of any cost from cutting wages. Since
the environment is stationary, v ∗ corresponds to the static Nash equilibrium wage.
We focus on Markov perfect equilibria, where the firm’s posted wage does not
depend on the history of play and is not a function of time; the wage depends on the
“state” of the profit function and the current market conditions and, in particular, a
worker’s market utility U , which the firm takes as given. In a stationary environment,
wages in Markov perfect equilibrium correspond to wages in static Nash equilibrium
(see the discussion in Camera and Kim, 2016).
The analysis identifies five key wage thresholds, which are illustrated in Figure
1: the exit wage z; the target wage v ∗ ; the trigger wage v τ ; the break-even wage v̄;
and the inactive threshold wage z̄. These thresholds allow us to fully characterize the
optimal posted wage, as reported in the following Theorem.
Theorem 1. Consider Markov-perfect strategies and any period t > 1. For any
given vt−1 , there exists a unique equilibrium sequence of profit-maximizing wages
∗
(vt∗ , vt+1
, . . .), which satisfies the following properties:
∗
1. If vt−1 ≤ v ∗ , then vt+j
= v ∗ for all j ≥ 0;
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2. If v ∗ < vt−1 ≤ v̄, then there exist a “trigger wage” v τ ∈ (v ∗ , v̄) such that

∗
vt+j





= vt−1

if vt−1 ∈ (v ∗ , v τ ]




∈ [v ∗ , v τ )

if vt−1 ∈ (v τ , v̄]

for all j ≥ 0;
3. If v̄ < vt−1 , then there exists an “inactive threshold” wage ω > z̄ such that
• vt∗ < v ∗ if vt−1 ∈ (v̄, ω), and otherwise the firm remains idle in t;
∗
• vt+j
= v ∗ for all j ≥ 1.

Theorem 1 establishes three facts. First, if the wage last period was below the
target wage, then wages immediately and fully adjust to the target v ∗ , as the firm
suffers no adjustment costs. This implies that, without external shocks, optimal wages
are constant in Markov equilibrium. They correspond to the target wage v ∗ , which
is simply the market wage in static Nash equilibrium.
The next two points demonstrate the existence of equilibrium wage rigidity, when
the firm must sustain an adjustment cost to lower its wage today. Whether or not
wages are cut, and by how much, depends on how bigger the previous period’s wage
vt−1 was as compared to the target wage v ∗ . The second item in Theorem 1 shows that
if the wage last period was above the target but below the trigger wage v τ , then this
period’s wage will be completely rigid. If instead, last period’s wage is between the
trigger wage and the break-even wage v̄, then the firm will partially lower the current
wage, moving it closer to the target v ∗ . That is, if the wage differential vt−1 − v ∗ is
sufficiently small, then the firm will not adjust wages at all at any point in time and
will keep the wage at vt−1 ; otherwise, it will partially adjust the wage, lowering it
toward the target.
The third item in Theorem 1 shows that if last period’s wage was so large to
11

overtake the break-even wage, then the wage will adjust to the target, but will do so
with a delay. The delay is due to the large adjustment cost that must be suffered
by the firm today. If vt−1 was sufficiently high, then the firm simply stays out of
the market today, and re-enters it tomorrow; this is equivalent to posting a zero
wage today. Otherwise, there will be “overshooting” of the target wage, because the
firm will post a wage below v ∗ today, only to raise it back up to v ∗ from tomorrow
on. Overshooting stems from the large adjustment cost, which forces the firm to cut
current labor costs by offering a low wage today in order to remain profitable.
The remainder of this section is devoted to prove this Theorem through a sequence of Lemmas. We start by establishing a preliminary result about symmetric
equilibrium in the static game, which is central to proving existence and uniqueness of
symmetric Markov equilibrium in the dynamic game. We then proceed by examining
optimal choices in the dynamic game. Finally, we will extend the analysis to the case
of unanticipated shocks to firms.

3.1

Preliminaries: equilibrium in the static game

Consider a static game. The firm’s profit function depends solely on the wage it
chooses to post. For the generic firm j, we have φ(v) = φ̃(v), with φ decreasing in
v. Consequently, in this section we omit the symbol ∼ from φ̃ for convenience, and
simply work with the notation φ. Note that, given the normalization b = 1, we have
v̄ = a and φ(v) = v̄ − v. For any given market utility U , the firm’s maximization
problem is thus

max M(λ)(v̄ − v)
v

such that
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H(λ)v = U.

From the constraint we obtain λ(v) as a function of v, which we can substitute into
the objective function to get

v ∗ := arg max M(λ(v))(v̄ − v).

(2)

v

Lemma 1 (Wages in Static Nash Equilibrium). If φ(v) = v̄ − v, with v̄ > 0, then the
optimal posted wage v is v ∗ = v ∗ (v̄). If φj (v) = v̄j − v for j = 1, 2 with v̄1 ≥ v̄2 , then
v1∗ ≥ v2∗ .
There are two important lessons. First, the firm’s optimal posted wage v ∗ is
uniquely determined by the break-even wage v̄. Second, optimal wages monotonically
increase in the break-even wage.
To prove Lemma 1, we study the first order condition of (2). In an interior
solution, the optimal value v ∗ must satisfy the first order condition G(v̄, v ∗ ) = 0
where

G(v̄, v ∗ ) :=

∂M(λ(v ∗ )) ∂λ(v ∗ )
×
(v̄ − v ∗ ) − M(λ(v ∗ )).
∂λ
∂v

Note that v ∗ only depends on v̄. Consider the two partial derivatives of G(v̄, v ∗ ), i.e.,

Gv̄ (v̄, v ∗ ) :=
∗

Gv∗ (v̄, v ) :=

∂M(λ(v ∗ )) ∂λ(v ∗ )
∂λ
∂v



∂ 2 M(λ(v ∗ ))
∂λ2



> 0,


∂λ(v ∗ ) 2
∂v

+

∂M(λ(v ∗ )) ∂ 2 λ(v ∗ )
∂λ
∂v 2



(v̄ − v ∗ ) − 2 ∂M(λ(v
∂λ

∗ ))

∂λ(v ∗ )
∂v

< 0.

The implicit function theorem, the characterization of the function λ(v) (see the
Appendix), and the properties of M imply
Gv̄ (v̄, v ∗ )
∂v ∗
=−
> 0.
∂v̄
Gv∗ (v̄, v ∗ )
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Now note that Gv∗ (v̄, v ∗ ), which is negative, represents the second order condition for
the problem in (2). Therefore, v ∗ uniquely maximizes the firm’s profit.
Lemma 1 is illustrated in Figure 3; it displays the optimal posted wage vj∗ for two
firms j = 1, 2, which depends only on the break-even wage v̄j that firm j can offer.
The left panel shows why the normalization bj = 1 is without loss in generality; there,
we have a2 < a1 and b2 < b1 = 1 such that

a2
b2

=

a1
b1

= v̄1 = v̄2 , so the two optimal

posted wages coincide. The right panel shows two firms with normalized b2 = b1 = 1
and a2 > a1 so v̄2 > v̄1 .
φj (v)

φj (v)

φ2

φ1

φ1
v1∗ = v2∗

v̄1 = v̄2

v

φ2

v1∗ v2∗

v̄1 v̄2

v

Figure 3: The optimal posted wage vj∗

3.2

The target wage in the dynamic game

Consider the dynamic game. We derive the sequence of target wages and show it is
constant. Recall that when workers are indifferent across firms, then demand on date
t is determined by λ(vt ). The expected profit function on date t is

M(vt )φ(vt ; vt−1 ) = M(vt )φ̃(vt ) − M(vt )(vt−1 − vt )c1vt <vt−1 ,

where for convenience we have omitted the argument λ from the function M(λ(vt )).
The central difference from the static game is that the expected profit function
M(vt )φ(vt ; vt−1 ) is not differentiable at vt = vt−1 because φ has a kink at that point.
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The kink is the consequence of the temporary decline in profit due to the variable
adjustment cost. Hence, define the partial derivative

F (vt ; vt−1 ) :=

∂{M(vt )φ̃(vt ) − M(vt )(vt−1 − vt )c}
,
∂vt

∂{M(vt )φ(vt ; vt−1 )}
for vt < vt−1 .
∂vt
Let Π(vt−1 ) denote the firm’s maximal lifetime utility, or maximal payoff, on

where we note that F (vt ; vt−1 ) =

date t given vt−1 . This is the maximal discounted sum of expected profits. Since the
environment is stationary we use the recursive formulation

Π(vt−1 ) = max{M(vt )φ(vt ; vt−1 ) + βΠ(vt )}
vt

(3)

= max Π(vt ; vt−1 ),
vt

where
Π(vt ; vt−1 ) := M(vt )φ(vt ; vt−1 ) + βΠ(vt ).
Let vt∗ := vt∗ (vt−1 ) be a solution to max Π(vt ; vt−1 ). In what follows we will show that
vt

the maximizer

vt∗

is unique and is in the interior of [0, v̄].

Lemma 2 (Target wages). There exists a unique solution vt = v ∗ ∈ (0, v̄), which
solves the firm’s problem max Π(vt ; vt−1 ) in each t = 1, 2, . . .
vt

Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that in t = 1 we have φ(v1 ; v0 ) = φ̃(v1 ), following the
definition in (1). Since the environment is stationary, consider an outcome such that
vt∗ = v ∗ ∈ [0, v̄] for all t. We have
Π(v ∗ ) =

M(vt )φ(vt ; vt−1 )
1−β

=
vt =vt−1 =v ∗

M(v ∗ )φ̃(v ∗ )
.
1−β

From earlier results we know that, for all v such that M(v) > 0, the function
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M(v)φ̃(v) is strictly concave and differentiable. That is, when the firm is in the
market, then his expected profit function is smooth and strictly concave (Peters,
1984). Consequently, there exists a unique interior optimum v ∗ that satisfies
∂{M(v ∗ )φ̃(v ∗ )}
= 0.
∂v
In fact, it is easy to see that the stationary sequence {v ∗ } is the unique equilibrium.
∗
Consider any sequence where at least one wage is off-target, i.e., {vt }∞
t=1 6= {v }.

From above, we have that v ∗ is the unique solution to max
M(v)φ̃(v). To show that
v
non-stationary sequences {vt }∞
t=1 are also suboptimal, using the definition of φ in
equation (1) we have
∞
M(v ∗ )φ̃(v ∗ ) X
Π(v ) =
β t−1 M(v ∗ )φ̃(v ∗ )
=
1−β
t=1
∗

>

∞
X

β t−1 M(vt )φ̃(vt ) ≥

∞
X

β t−1 M(vt )φ(vt ; vt−1 ).

t=1

t=1

Lemma 2 proves that in Markov equilibrium wages coincide with the target wage
v ∗ in each period. The open question is: what wage would the firm optimally post
currently, if it last period it posted a wage that does not correspond to the current
target? Hence, in what follows, we discuss the optimal wage vt∗ for any off-target case
vt−1 6= v ∗ . For convenience, we define

F̃ (v) :=

∂{M(v)φ̃(v)}
,
∂v

so that at the optimum v = v ∗ we have F̃ (v ∗ ) = 0.
Given the formulation for φ in equation (1) we need to consider left and right
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derivatives, which we respectively denote
f (x) − f (x0 )
,
x→x0 −
x − x0

f−0 (x0 ) := lim

and

f (x) − f (x0 )
.
x→x0 +
x − x0

f+0 (x0 ) := lim

As usual, if f−0 (x0 ) = f+0 (x0 ) < ∞, then f is differentiable at x0 , in which case we
define f 0 (x0 ) := f−0 (x0 ) = f+0 (x0 ).

3.3

The optimal wage when the previous wage is off-target

In this section we show how to calculate the optimum wage vt∗ when the previous
wage was off-target. There are several cases to consider, depending on whether vt−1
is (i) above or below the target wage v ∗ and (ii) near to or far from v ∗ .
vt∗
vt−1

v∗

v̄

Figure 4: Case 1 The optimal wage vt∗ when vt−1 < v ∗ .
Lemma 3 (Full adjustment). If vt−1 < v ∗ on date t, then vt∗ = v ∗ uniquely solves
∗
= v ∗ for all j ≥ 1.
max Π(vt ; vt−1 ), hence vt+j
vt

Proof of Lemma 3. Let vt−1 < v ∗ on date t. By definition φ̃(v ∗ ) = φ(v ∗ ; vt−1 ).
The firm’s optimal choice is vt∗ = v ∗ because the maximum payoff is achieved at v ∗ :
Π(v ∗ ) = M(v ∗ )φ̃(v ∗ ) + βΠ(v ∗ ) = M(v ∗ )φ(v ∗ ; vt−1 ) + βΠ(v ∗ ).
Lemma 3 establishes that if the firm yesterday posted a wage that is below the
current target, then it is optimal to raise the wage back to the target level. This is
so because raising the wage increases the firm’s expected profit and there is no cost.
Hence, calculation of equilibrium wages follows the standard analysis.
Things are different when the firm has previously posted a wage above target.
Here the firm faces a profit decline in period t due to the cost. To discuss this case,
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we define the left derivative
Π(vt ; vt−1 ) − Π(v; vt−1 )
vt →v−
vt − v

Π0− (v; vt−1 ) := lim

and similarly for the opposite right derivative Π0+ (v; vt−1 ).
The first step to understand optimal wage setting when vt−1 > v ∗ , is to establish
where vt∗ lies relative to the state vt−1 .
Lemma 4 (Direction of adjustment). If vt−1 > v ∗ on date t, then the firm optimally
chooses vt∗ ≤ vt−1 .
Proof of Lemma 4. The proof is by contradiction. Suppose that there exist some
vt−1 > v ∗ such that vt∗ > vt−1 is optimal. In fact, we have
Π(vt−1 ; vt−1 ) = M(vt−1 )φ(vt−1 ; vt−1 ) + βΠ(vt−1 )
≥ M(vt−1 )φ(vt−1 ; vt−1 ) + βΠ(vt∗ ) = M(vt−1 )φ̃(vt−1 ) + βΠ(vt∗ )
> M(vt∗ )φ̃(vt∗ ) + βΠ(vt∗ ) = M(vt∗ )φ(vt∗ ; vt−1 ) + βΠ(vt∗ )
= Π(vt∗ ; vt−1 ),
which contradicts that vt∗ is optimal. The first inequality follows from the fact that
the maximal payoff Π(vt−1 ) can be no less than Π(vt∗ ) since by conjecture vt∗ > vt−1 .
The second inequality follows from the concavity of M(vt )φ̃(vt ) which is maximized
at vt = v ∗ and the observation that φ(vt∗ ; vt−1 ) = φ̃(vt∗ ) when vt∗ > vt−1 .

A firm that has (incorrectly) posted wages above the target v ∗ has an incentive
to revert back to the optimal target and not to compound the problem by moving
further away from it. Hence, the firm will not offer more than vt−1 on date t. The
central question is whether the firm will find it optimal to fully or partially adjust
wages back to the target v ∗ , or not adjust them at all.
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To proceed, define the trigger wage v τ > v ∗ as follows. If the firm yesterday posted
vt−1 = v τ , then the firm is indifferent to marginally cut its wage below vt−1 . Hence,
v τ is the solution to
F̃ (v)
+ M(v)c = 0.
1−β
F̃ (v)
accounts for the marginal revenue decline from not altering wages,
1−β
while M(v)c accounts for the marginal savings from avoiding temporary profit losses.
The term

Lemma 5. A unique solution v τ to the equation

F̃ (v)
+ M(v)c = 0 exists in (v ∗ , v̄).
1−β

Proof of Lemma 5. If we evaluate it at v = v ∗ , then
F̃ (v ∗ )
+ M(v ∗ )c = M(v ∗ )c > 0,
1−β
since F̃ (v ∗ ) = 0 by definition. If we evaluate it at the break-even wage v = v̄, then
M0 (v̄)φ̃(v̄) M(v̄)
F̃ (v̄)
+ M(v̄)c =
−
+ M(v̄)c
1−β
1−β
1−β
!
1
= c−
M(v̄) < 0,
1−β
where we have used the fact that φ̃(v̄) = 0 and 1 > c (by definition). By the continuity
of the evaluated function, we can find a solution v τ ∈ (v ∗ , v̄). Uniqueness of the
solution v τ follows from noticing that M(v) is strictly concave and monotonically
increasing in v ∈ [v ∗ , v̄]. That is,
F̃ 0 (v) + M0 (v)(1 − β)c = M00 (v)φ̃(v) − M0 (v)[2 − (1 − β)c] < 0.

Hence

F̃ (v)
+ M(v)c is monotonically decreasing, and the solution is unique.
1−β
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Therefore

F̃ (v)
+ M(v)c ≥ 0 for all v ∈ (v ∗ , v τ ].
1−β

Lemma 6 (Wage rigidity). If vt−1 ∈ (v ∗ , v τ ] on date t, then vt∗ = vt−1 uniquely solves
∗
= vt−1 for all j ≥ 1.
the firm’s problem max Π(vt ; vt−1 ). Hence, vt+j
vt

Proof of Lemma 6. Let vt−1 ∈ (v ∗ , v τ ] on date t. There are three possible cases:
∗
∗
∗
= vt∗ . We will show that the first two cases are
< vt∗ , and vt+1
> vt∗ , vt+1
vt+1

impossible, while the third case represents the solution to the firm’s problem.
∗
(i) vt+1
> vt∗ : By Lemma 4, we must have vt∗ < v ∗ . Note that

Π(v; vt−1 ) − Π(v ∗ ; vt−1 )
v→v −
v − v∗
M(v)φ(v; vt−1 ) − M(v ∗ )φ(v ∗ ; vt−1 ) + βΠ(v) − βΠ(v ∗ )
= lim∗
v→v −
v − v∗

Π0− (v ∗ ; vt−1 ) = lim∗

=F (v ∗ ; vt−1 ) > 0.
In the third line we have used the fact that Π(v) = Π(v ∗ ) for any v ≤ v ∗ ; and
the inequality comes from Lemma 1. However, it contradicts that vt∗ < v ∗ because
the firm can marginally increase the wage and improve its expected payoff. Hence
∗
> vt∗ is inconsistent with optimality.
vt+1
∗
< vt∗ : By the recursive nature of the problem, we must have vt∗ < vt−1 . To
(ii) vt+1

show that this inequality holds, suppose it is not true. Then, by Lemma 4 we can
only have vt∗ = vt−1 ; if so, then the firm would face the same problem tomorrow, so
∗
∗
we must have vt+1
= vt∗ . But this is in contradiction with the conjecture vt+1
< vt∗ .

Given that vt∗ < vt−1 , note that since Π(vt−1 ) = max{M(vt )φ(vt ; vt−1 ) + βΠ(vt )}
vt

and

vt∗

0

< vt−1 , then Π (vt−1 ) is well defined and equals to −M(vt∗ )c by the envelope

20

theorem. Note that
Π(v; vt−1 ) − Π(vt−1 ; vt−1 )
v→vt−1 −
v − vt−1
M(v)φ(v; vt−1 ) − M(vt−1 )φ(vt−1 ; vt−1 ) + βΠ(v) − βΠ(vt−1 )
= lim
v→vt−1 −
v − vt−1

Π0− (vt−1 ; vt−1 ) =

lim

=F̃ (vt−1 ) + M(vt−1 )c − βM(vt∗ )c
>F̃ (vt−1 ) + M(vt−1 )c − βM(vt−1 )c > 0.
In the third line we have used the fact that Π0 (vt−1 ) = −M(vt∗ )c; the fourth line comes
F̃ (v)
from vt∗ < vt−1 ; and the last inequality comes from the fact that
+ M(v)c is
1−β
monotonically decreasing and vt−1 < v τ . Hence we find a contradiction for vt∗ < vt−1 .
∗
Therefore vt+1
< vt∗ is inconsistent with optimality.
∗
∗
∗
= vt∗ should be optimal for all j ≥ 1
= vt∗ is optimal, then vt+j
= vt∗ : If vt+1
(iii) vt+1

by the recursive nature of the problem. For any v ∈ (v ∗ , vt−1 ), the marginal payoff is
"

#

∂
β
β
M(v)φ(v; vt−1 ) +
M(v)φ̃(v) =F (v, vt−1 ) +
F̃ (v)
∂v
1−β
1−β
1
F̃ (v) + M(v)c − M0 (v)(vt−1 − v)c.
=
1−β
The limit of the above first order condition as v → vt−1 from the left is
1
F̃ (vt−1 ) + M(vt−1 )c > 0.
1−β
Together with Lemma 4, vt∗ = vt−1 is the unique solution to the firm’s problem.
Lemma 6 establishes that a firm finding itself with wages slightly above target
will not adjust wages at all, neither presently nor in the future. The firm has no
incentive to adjust the current wage because the cost is larger than the benefit. By
the recursive nature of the problem, the firm has no incentive to perform adjustments
in the future, either. Figure 5 provides an illustration.
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Π(vt ; vt−1 )
Π0− (vt∗ ; vt−1 ) > 0

v

∗

vt−1 =

vt∗

v

τ

vt
v̄

Figure 5: Case 2: The kink at vt∗ when vt−1 ∈ (v ∗ , v τ )
Yesterday’s wage in the figure is above the optimal target, although not so much,
i.e., we have vt−1 ∈ (v ∗ , v τ ). The curved thin line represents the expected profit
Π(vt ; vt−1 ), which reveals that the firm benefits from raising the wage from v ∗ because
the marginal profit is positive, declining as we move towards vt−1 . The straight
thick line represents the marginal profit when vt = vt−1 , which is still positive, i.e.,
Π0− (vt ; vt−1 ) > 0. So, why does the firm choose to stop at this point, and post
vt∗ = vt−1 , instead of moving further up? Going beyond vt−1 causes a discrete drop
in the firm’s marginal profit, because at vt−1 the firm suffers a temporary adjustment
cost that generates a kink in the payoff. This is illustrated by the dashed, declining
curve. Hence, the firm should neither lower the wage back down to the target v ∗ ,
nor increase it above vt−1 . The firm should simply offer the same wage it offered
yesterday, vt∗ = vt−1 .
It is important to emphasize that the firm does not face exogenous restrictions to
its ability to offer wages because the choice set remains [0, v̄]. Lemma 6 shows that
the firm optimally chooses not to lower wages down to the target level v ∗ because
doing so would entail an extra-marginal cost. The Lemma proves that when wages
are slightly above target, then this extra-marginal cost is greater than the revenue
decline associated with adjusting the wage back to target.
The question that remains to be discussed is: what happens to wages when the
firm’s wages are significantly above target?
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Lemma 7 (Sticky wages). If vt−1 ∈ (v τ , v̄) on date t, then there exists a unique
∗
= vt∗
Π(vt ; vt−1 ) such that vt∗ ∈ (v ∗ , v τ ). Hence, vt+j
solution to the firm’s problem max
vt
∂vt∗
for all j ≥ 1. Furthermore,
< 0.
∂vt−1

Proof of Lemma 7. The left-sided first order condition evaluated at the trigger
wage vt = v τ is
Π(v; vt−1 ) − Π(v τ ; vt−1 )
v→v −
v − vτ
M(v)φ(v; vt−1 ) − M(v τ )φ(v τ ; vt−1 ) + βΠ(v) − βΠ(v τ )
= limτ
v→v −
v − vτ
τ
β F̃ (v )
=F (v τ ; vt−1 ) +
1−β
τ
F̃ (v )
=
+ M(v τ )c − M0 (v τ )(vt−1 − v τ )c
1−β

Π0− (v τ ; vt−1 ) = limτ

= − M0 (v τ )(vt−1 − v τ )c < 0.
M(v)φ(v; v)
for v ∈ (v ∗ , v τ ] by
1−β
Lemma 6; in the fourth line we have decomposed F (v τ ; vt−1 ); and in the last line we

In the third line we have used the fact that Π(v) =

have used F̃ (v τ ) + (1 − β)M(v τ )c = 0. Therefore vt∗ < v τ .
The right-sided first order condition evaluated at vt = v ∗ is
Π(v; vt−1 ) − Π(v ∗ ; vt−1 )
v→v +
v − v∗
M(v)φ(v; vt−1 ) − M(v ∗ )φ(v ∗ ; vt−1 ) + βΠ(v) − βΠ(v ∗ )
= lim∗
v→v +
v − v∗
∗
β F̃ (v )
=F (v ∗ ; vt−1 ) +
1−β

Π0+ (v ∗ ; vt−1 ) = lim∗

=M(v ∗ )c − M0 (v ∗ )(vt−1 − v ∗ )c > 0.

The third line is derived from Π(v) =

M(v)φ(v; v)
for v ∈ [v ∗ , v τ ], and the inequality
1−β
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comes from the fact that v ∗ satisfies
M(v ∗ ) − M0 (v ∗ )(v̄ − v ∗ ) = 0,

(4)

which is the first order condition for the static game equilibrium. Hence we also have
vt∗ ≥ v ∗ . Note that the left and right derivatives of Π(v; vt−1 ) at v ∈ (v ∗ , v τ ) are the
same (because the function is differentiable at that point), so we can find vt∗ ∈ (v ∗ , v τ )
by using the first order condition Π0 (v; vt−1 ) evaluated at v = vt∗ , i.e.,
F (vt∗ ; vt−1 ) +

β F̃ (vt∗ )
F̃ (vt∗ )
=
+ M(vt∗ )c − M0 (vt∗ )(vt−1 − vt∗ )c = 0.
1−β
1−β

M0 (vt∗ )c
∂vt∗
< 0, since the denomi= 0 ∗
We have
∂vt−1
F̃ (vt )
∗
∗
∗
00
0
+ 2M (vt )c − M (vt )(vt−1 − vt )c
1−β
nator is negative. The denominator is negative because
∂
∂vt∗
=



F̃ (vt∗ )
1−β

F̃ 0 (vt∗ )
1−β

+

M(vt∗ )c

−M

0

(vt∗ )(vt−1

−

vt∗ )c



+ 2M0 (vt∗ )c − M00 (vt∗ )(vt−1 − vt∗ )c < F̃ 0 (vt∗ ) + 2M0 (vt∗ ) − M00 (vt∗ )(vt−1 − vt∗ )

= M00 (vt∗ )[φ̃(vt∗ ) − (vt−1 − vt∗ )] = M00 (vt∗ )φ̃(vt−1 ) < 0.
The second line is derived from the fact that F̃ 0 (vt∗ ) < 0 and 2M0 (vt∗ )−M00 (vt∗ )(vt−1 −
vt∗ ) > 0 with c < 1.
Due to the recursive nature of the firm’s problem and Lemma 6, we have vt+j = vt∗
for all j = 1, 2, . . .
Consider the case when vt−1 ∈ (v τ , v̄), which roughly corresponds to the case
when the firm yesterday posted a wage that is considerably above the target wage
v ∗ . Lemma 7 shows that the firm will lower the wage, posting a value vt∗ in between
the target wage v ∗ and the trigger wage v τ . In this case the temporary loss from
adjusting the wage is dominated by the gain in expected revenue. By the recursive
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nature of the problem, the firm has no incentive to perform further adjustments in the
future and will keep wages constant thereafter. Wages are adjusted downward only
in the current period because further adjustments would be costly; hence, progressive
adjustment is inherently suboptimal for the firm.
Figure 6 provides an illustration. Last period the firm posted a wage vt−1 that is
above the trigger wage v τ , but still below the break-even wage v̄. To maximize the
payoff, the firm lowers the wage toward v ∗ , stopping at vt∗ .
Π(vt ; vt−1 )
Π0 (vt∗ ; vt−1 ) = 0

v∗

vt∗

vτ

vt−1 v̄

vt

Figure 6: Case 3: No kink at vt∗ when vt−1 ∈ (v τ , v̄)
The equilibrium wage for the case studied in Lemma 7, and depicted in Figure
6, has an interesting property. Larger departures of the previous period’s wage vt−1
from the target wage v ∗ result in a larger wage cut, i.e., a smaller current wage vt∗ .
In other words, the firm optimally chooses to adjust the wage closer and closer to the
target wage v ∗ as vt−1 moves further and further away from the trigger level v τ .
Why would we observe a current wage offer vt∗ that decreases in the firm’s previous
wage offer vt−1 ? The reason is that a change in wage has two effects. It alters
realized profit conditional on match with a worker because it alters the cost of
labor (intensive margin). It also alters expected profits because it alters the expected
number of workers λ, hence the probability of match (extensive margin). By cutting
the wage relative to previous period’s wage, the firm suffers an adjustment cost. As
discussed in Section 2, this adjustment cost be interpreted as a productivity decline.
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A large wage cut i.e., a wage cut bringing vt∗ close to the target v ∗

allows the firm

to counteract this productivity decline by decreasing its labor cost. All else equal,
larger values of vt−1 bring about a larger productivity decline, which magnifies the
firm’s desire do reduce labor costs, inducing it to lower the wage even closer to the
target v ∗ . The firm does not cut the wage all the way to v ∗ because doing so greatly
reduces the matching probability, causing an expected revenue loss that outweighs
the savings from lower labor costs.
Now consider vt−1 = v̄, i.e., the firm posted the break-even wage. Here, there will
be full adjustment to the target wage v ∗ because

vt∗ = arg max M(v)φ(v; v̄) + βΠ(v)
v

= arg max(1 − c)M(v)φ̃(v) + βΠ(v)
v≤v̄

= arg max M(v)φ̃(v) + βΠ(v) = v ∗ .
v≤v̄

The second equality follows from two observations. First, the firm chooses a wage
v ≤ v̄ (by Lemma 4). Second, when vt−1 = v̄ we have φ(v; v̄) = (1−c)φ̃(v) (definitions
of profit functions). This second observation is crucial: it implies that a firm that
posted the break-even wage last period, will currently suffer an adjustment cost for
any profitable wage it will choose to post. The question is then, how large a cost
should the firm suffer conditional on hiring. Note that in this case the profit function
has no kink but it is linear. If so, then marginal profits are zero at vt∗ = v ∗ , as when
there are no adjustment costs at all because the only optimality element that matters
when the profit function is linear is the break even wage (Lemma 1). This implies
the third equality, i.e., the solution to the maximization problem is equivalent to the
unique solution to the unconstrained problem.
Now consider the case when the wage from the previous period, vt−1 , is so large
that is lies above the break-even wage v̄. This corresponds to the third item in
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Theorem 1. Let z < v ∗ denote the exit wage; any firm that offers v ≤ z cannot
attract workers so the firm exits the market. Recall that the firm takes a worker’s
market utility U as given. Consequently, workers’ indifference implies that z = U
and if v > z, then H(λ)v = U .
Let z̄ > v̄ be the inactive threshold, i.e., if vt−1 ≥ z̄, then the firm cannot earn a
profit by offering something above v̄. Moreover, the adjustment cost is so large that
the firm cannot be profitable even if it offers a wage below v̄. Hence, if vt−1 ≥ z̄, then
it is optimal for a firm to be inactive in t. Here, z̄ uniquely solves φ(z̄; z) = 0.
φ̃(v)

φ(v; vt−1 )
φ(v; z̄)

v̄ vt−1

z̄
v

z

Figure 7: The profit function φ in period t, when vt−1 > v̄
Lemma 8. Let vt−1 ∈ (v̄, z̄) on date t > 1. There exists a unique solution to the
∗
firm’s problem max Π(vt ; vt−1 ) such that vt∗ < v ∗ . Hence, vt+j
= v ∗ for all j ≥ 1.
vt

Proof. Let vt−1 ∈ (v̄, z̄). The left-sided first order condition evaluated at vt = v ∗ is
Π(v; vt−1 ) − Π(v ∗ ; vt−1 )
v→v −
v − v∗
M(v)φ(v; vt−1 ) − M(v ∗ )φ(v ∗ ; vt−1 ) + βΠ(v) − βΠ(v ∗ )
= lim∗
v→v −
v − v∗
∗
M(v)φ(v; vt−1 ) − M(v )φ(v ∗ ; vt−1 )
= lim∗
= F (v ∗ ; vt−1 )
v→v −
v − v∗

Π0− (v ∗ ; vt−1 ) = lim∗

=F̃ (v ∗ ) + M(v ∗ )c − M0 (v ∗ )(vt−1 − v ∗ )c < 0.
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The third line is obtained by noticing that the continuation payoff on date t is
M(v ∗ )φ(v ∗ ; v ∗ )
for all v < v ∗ by Lemma 3; in the last line, we
Π(v) = Π(v ∗ ) =
1−β
have decomposed F (v ∗ ; vt−1 ); and in the inequality is obtained by F̃ (v ∗ ) = 0, and
vt−1 > v̄ with the equation (4). Therefore, it is optimal for the firm to post v < v ∗ .
As the firm cannot attract workers if vt ≤ z, we have
Π(v; vt−1 ) = M(v)φ(v; vt−1 ) + βΠ(v) > M(x)φ(x; vt−1 ) + βΠ(x) = Π(x; vt−1 )
for any x ≤ z and v = z + ε where ε > 0 is small. Therefore it is optimal for the firm
to attract workers by posting v > z. Since
Π(v; vt−1 ) = M(v)φ(v; vt−1 ) + βΠ(v) = M(v)φ(v; vt−1 ) + βΠ(v ∗ )
for any v ∈ (z, v ∗ ), it is clear that vt∗ can be uniquely found by the strict concavity
of M(v)φ(v; vt−1 ) for v ∈ (z, v ∗ ). Therefore in period t, the firm uniquely posts
vt∗ ∈ (z, v ∗ ). In subsequent periods, by Theorem 1, the firm posts v ∗ .
Lemma 8 says that when vt−1 ∈ (v̄, z̄), the firm will overreact by immediately
lowering the wage below the target level v ∗ , and then bringing it back up to v ∗ the
period after. Intuitively, the overreaction occurs because large adjustment cost have a
very strong impact on the intensive margin effect of wage cuts. To see this, note that
in this equilibrium the adjustment cost is very large, all else equal. Decreasing labor
costs is thus of primary importance for the firm as compared to raising the probability
of match with a worker. It follows that it is optimal for the firm to manage large
adjustment costs by sharply reducing labor costs, posting a wage below the target
v ∗ . Next period, the firm can costlessly raise the wage back to the target level to
optimally compete for workers with other firms.
The next lemma considers the case when yesterday’s wage is extremely off target,
i.e., vt−1 ≥ z̄.
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Lemma 9. Let vt−1 ≥ z̄ on date t. The firm will be inactive in period t and re-enter
∗
= v ∗ for all j ≥ 1.
it in period t + 1, optimally setting vt+j

The proof immediately follows from the earlier observation that if vt−1 ≥ z̄, then
the firm cannot achieve a positive payoff in t due to the large adjustment cost. This
effectively forces the firm off the market in t, in order to re-enter it in t + 1.

3.4

Equilibrium wages after a permanent shock

Here we apply the lessons from Theorem 1 to the case of an unanticipated permanent
shock that moves the firm’s break-even wage v̄ to a new level ω̄. As a consequence,
the target wage will change from v ∗ , to a new level denoted ω ∗ . We will differentiate
between positive shocks in which ω̄ > v̄, and negative shocks, where ω̄ < v̄.5
Equilibrium wages will respond asymmetrically, depending on whether the unanticipated shock is positive or negative. In particular, wages can be “downward sticky.”
The firm will immediately raise wages to the new target ω ∗ > v ∗ in response to a
positive shock. But, it will react differently when the shock is negative. A firm that
is subject to a small negative shock might choose not to bring wages down to the new
target ω ∗ , keeping them at the old target v ∗ indefinitely. Instead, a large negative
shock may induce the firm to partially or fully lower wages to the new target ω ∗ ,
depending on the size of the shock. A very large negative shock will force the firm to
leave the market temporarily or permanently.
To show this, we only need to consider shocks that reduce the firm’s break-even
wage so much that the new break-even level ends up being below yesterday’s wage,
ω̄ < vt−1 . In this case only wages below ω̄ guarantee a positive profit to the firm on
t; hence, since ω̄ < vt−1 , a firm who wants to remain in the market will have to lower
wages relative to what it posted the day before.
5

The source of the shock is not important at this point, although later in this Section we will provide
some examples.
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It is immediate that if the negative shock is so large that the new break even wage
falls below the exit wage, then the firm will permanently exit the market since it can
no longer profitably hire workers.
Therefore, consider the case when the negative shock is not so extreme. That
is, the break-even wage ω̄ remains above the exit wage. Following Theorem 1, there
can be two cases. In the more favorable case, the firm will overreact by immediately
lowering the wage below the new target level, raising the wage to the target level only
tomorrow. In the less favorable case, the firm exists the market and re-enters it next
∗
period by posting the new target wage vt+1
= ω∗.

It is worth mentioning that the analysis carries over to the case of market-wide
shocks in which a small measurable set of firms receives a shock that does not change
the exit wage. Shocks of this type might change the demand for each firm if the
shocks induce some firms to exit the market and they may alter the workers’ market
utility U whenever firms adjust wages or exit the market. In all of these cases each
firm will have a new target wage ω ∗ and the preceding analysis can be adapted to
study wage stickiness. Some examples of this kind are offered in the Appendix.

4

Discussion

This paper has extended the basic directed search model by introducing a variable wage adjustment cost. The set-up considers dynamic, two-sided labor markets where matching frictions and downward wage rigidity emerge as an equilibrium
phenomenon. In the model firms compete for workers by posting wages and the distribution of demand for jobs is endogenous because workers choose where to apply.
This basic directed search model is modified by introducing a variable cost that a
firm incurs when it wants to adjust the wage downward relative to the past wage.
The analysis identifies four endogenous wage thresholds, which allow a full characterization of equilibrium wage stickiness: an exit wage, below which the firm cannot
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recruit workers; a target wage, which maximizes the firm’s profit in the absence of any
adjustment cost from lowering wages; a trigger wage, below which the firm optimally
chooses not to respond to unanticipated shocks; a break-even wage, above which there
is no wage rigidity; and an inactive threshold wage above which the firm prefers to
remain temporarily idle.
The study complements other studies of wage rigidity, which have been conducted
using one-sided labor markets where frictions are due to costs from hiring or searching
for appropriate counterparts. One approach is to directly assume a suitable real wage
schedule (e.g., Blanchard and Galı́, 2010). By contrast, in our model the underlying
wage selection mechanism is made explicit. Another approach is to leverage the idea
of focal points in bargaining when wage strategies are history- and state-independent
(Hall, 2005). By contrast, our analysis does not rely on assuming that players are
able to coordinate on a market-wide scale. A third approach revolves around the idea
that if market participants can commit to long-term plans, then insurance motives
may lead to a constant wage for risk-averse workers (Rudanko, 2009). By contrast,
commitment is relaxed in our analysis.
The argument made in the paper relies on the assumption that the adjustment cost
linearly depends on the magnitude of the wage cut, and does not depend on the level
of the old wage. An alternative formulation of nonlinear adjustment costs could alter
the main result, but only when differences between the target wage and the previous
period’s wage are sufficiently large. For sufficiently small differences differences that
imply a small variation in the optimal wage v ∗ , that is then our linear formulation
would still be a good approximation for any smooth cost function, so nonlinearities
would not alter the result. However, for large differences this approximation would
not be suitable and this could have consequences. In particular, a convex cost function
might remove the incentive to perform large wage cuts. If so, then the firm would
find it optimal to perform a sequence of small wages cuts, instead of one single, large
wage cut.
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Our directed search model has the key characteristic that the matching function
is endogenous, players are searching in each period and cannot commit to future
wages or matches. It is therefore instructive to consider these features in relation
to the literature where the random matching function is exogenous (e.g. urn-ball
matching), and where matches can be multi-period with external separation shocks.
On the first point, whether search is directed or random matters when there is
a wage adjustment cost. Our analysis cannot be simplified by imposing an urnball matching process (e.g., Stevens, 2007). The micro-foundation for the matching
function M is not equivalent to an urn-ball matching specification. In the latter,
wage changes cannot increase the firm’s matching probability because meetings are
exogenously random. By contrast, in our model search is endogenously random and
wage changes affect the firm’s matching rate in and out of equilibrium. In particular,
offering a wage below competitors lowers the probability to meet workers, even in
an infinitely large market. Consequently, endogenizing the matching function has
implications for firms’ desire to cut wages following a shock. With random matching, a
firm who has variable adjustment costs adjusts the wage if it lays above the reservation
value. This is not necessarily true with directed search, because workers will react by
decreasing the probability to visit the firm. This means a shorter queue for the firm,
hence lower expected profit. This tradeoff is absent under random matching, which
therefore makes wage stickiness less likely, even under variable adjustment costs.
On the second point, the analysis suggests that, if we relaxed the assumption of
100% separation rate at the end of each period, then there would be scope for wage
rigidity of existing workers versus new hires. To understand why we think this would
be so, for the sake of the argument, consider a firm-worker pair in which the firm
hired the worker yesterday. Suppose that the match can be sustained for as long as it
is in the best interest of the two parties. What would the firm pay the worker today?
One can prove that both worker and firm have an interest in remaining matched as
long as the wage does not drop below the threshold represented by the market utility
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U . The worker has no incentive to leave the firm and search for another job if the
wage v ≥ U ; and the firm has no interest in paying her more than U . So v = U is
optimal. The wage of an existing worker would thus be “sticky” at U , as long as the
firm does not suffer a shock forcing it out of the market at that wage. However, this
would not be so if the firm had to advertise for new hires, because the offered wage
would vary with the firm’s shocks. In this sense, our model is consistent with the
empirical observation that wage rigidity is more prominent for pre-existing workers,
but not for new hires (Haefke et al., 2013).
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Appendix

∂λ
∂ 2λ
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.
∂v
∂v 2

Derivation of

Given U > 0, λ is a function of v such that H(λ)v = U . i.e. (1 − e−λ )v = U λ. Hence
e−λ v

∂λ
∂λ
+ 1 − e−λ = U
∂v
∂v

By substituting U =

⇒

∂λ
1 − e−λ
=
.
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Let g(λ) = 2 − λ − (λ + 2)e−λ . Then g(0) = 0 and
g 0 (λ) = −1 + (1 + λ)e−λ < 0

for all λ > 0.

Hence g(λ) < 0 for all λ > 0. As a result, we have
∂ 2λ
< 0.
∂v 2

Examples
In this section we provide two examples of possible shocks that alter the firm’s target
wage. A first possibility is that the firm experiences a productivity shock, which
changes the underlying cost structure of the firm. For example, consider a shock that
results in a parallel shift of the profit function φ.
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Figure 8: The impact of a small negative shock the profit function φold .
Figures 8 illustrates a small negative productivity shock on period t, which lowers
the break-even wage to ω̄ < v̄.
|I|
= r be the new
We can also consider unanticipated demand shocks. Let
|J |
market queue following a shock on date t. This change in the queue alters the target
wage. To find the new target wage v ∗ , we need to find the solution to
arg max M(λ; r)φ̃(v)
v

such that H(λ(v; r))v = H(λj (vj ; r))vj for any j ∈ J .
As the market queue r increases, the target wage v ∗ decreases. i.e.
∂v ∗
< 0.
∂r
To see this note that the first order condition at the target wage v ∗ is
∂M(λ(v ∗ ; r)) ∂λ(v ∗ ; r)
(v̄ − v ∗ ) − M(λ(v ∗ ; r)) = 0.
∂λ
∂v
By the implicit function theorem,
∂v ∗
C(v ∗ ; r)
=−
∂r
B(v ∗ ; r)
where
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+
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B(v ∗ ; r) represents the second order condition. It is also easy to see C(v ∗ ; r) < 0.
37

<0

Given v, as the market queue r increases, the demand for the each firm increases, i.e.
∂λ(v; r)
> 0, so it is straightforward to see that the last term of C(v ∗ ; r) is negative.
∂r
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< 0. For the remaining terms, we have
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We obtain the second line using
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